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BP’s five crucial decisions leading to Deepwater Horizon disaster
“But who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine.” Those words from a BP engineer—e-mailed just four days before the Deepwater Horizon explosion—may haunt the company as much as any of the rest of the compelling evidence of reckless cost cutting that led to the deaths of 11 workers and the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history.
A letter addressed to BP CEO Tony Heyward from the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce was sent three days before Heyward’s Thursday appearance in front of the committee. Signed by Chairmen Henry Waxman and Bart Stupak, it was released to the public this week and references numerous issues raised by the Committee’s investigation into the disaster. The issues are supported by internal company documents including the BP engineer’s e-mail.
The letter outlines five crucial decisions made by BP to cut corners and speed up the Macondo well project which was weeks behind schedule and millions of dollars over budget.
I) Well Design. BP had a choice of two methods to complete the final 1,192 feet of well casing; the hole had been drilled down to 18,360 feet below sea level. One way was to lower a “full string of casing” all the way from the top of the wellhead to the bottom. This method was not recommended in a company plan review because it provided only limited barriers to potential gas flow in the annular space surrounding the steel tubing. The second way, which was recommended, involved hanging a liner from the bottom of the existing casing and installing a so-called “tieback” on top of the liner. Even though this method would have given greater barriers against gas flow, it would have cost up to $10 million more and delayed the project. Thus, BP chose the riskier full string method.
II) Centralizers. These are spacers that ensure the casing runs down the middle of the wellbore. If the casing is uneven, the chances increase of a poor cement job. Halliburton, the contractor hired to cement the well, recommended using 21 centralizers for the final casing string and warned BP of a “SEVERE gas flow” if a lesser amount were used. BP, which had final say on the project, ordered only six centralizers. “It will take 10 hours to install them…I do not like this,” argued a company engineer in an April 16 e-mail.
III) Cement Bond Log. This is a 9-to-12 hour acoustic test to determine if the cement bonds to the casing. Though BP brought a team to conduct the test on April 20, the company sent the crew away without conducting the test. This even though its own report predicted a failed cement job. One independent expert called the decision “horribly wrong.”
IV) Mud Circulation. Though industry standards call for a full circulation of drilling mud from bottom to top to test for gas influxes, BP cut the test significantly short.
V) Lockdown Sleeve. BP decided not to use a casing hanger lockdown sleeve to prevent the seal around the wellhead from being blown out from the bottom.
The Congressional letter concludes by citing BP’s “carelessness and complacency.”
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